Sovereign debt needs strong collective action clauses – ECB paper
CACs with bond-by-bond voting fail to prevent creditor holdouts, researchers find
Only the strongest form of collective action clause (CAC), in sovereign debt is likely to achieve its aims, a European Central Bank paper finds.
In Restructuring sovereign bonds: holdouts, haircuts and the effectiveness of CACs, Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher and Christoph Trebesch study the “holdout problem”, when creditors refuse to participate in a sovereign debt restructuring.
The authors use data on 23 episodes of sovereign bond restructurings involving foreign creditors since 1994. This
Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.
To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact info@centralbanking.com or view our subscription options here: http://subscriptions.centralbanking.com/subscribe
You are currently unable to print this content. Please contact info@centralbanking.com to find out more.
You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact info@centralbanking.com to find out more.
Copyright Infopro Digital Limited. All rights reserved.
As outlined in our terms and conditions, https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/ (point 2.4), printing is limited to a single copy.
If you would like to purchase additional rights please email info@centralbanking.com
Copyright Infopro Digital Limited. All rights reserved.
You may share this content using our article tools. As outlined in our terms and conditions, https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/ (clause 2.4), an Authorised User may only make one copy of the materials for their own personal use. You must also comply with the restrictions in clause 2.5.
If you would like to purchase additional rights please email info@centralbanking.com